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For over fifteen years, the health care industry has fallen short in its search for effective strategies to 
reduce incidents of medical error and eliminate preventable harm. Patients continue to be harmed at 
alarming rates by the very health care delivery system intended to heal them. Early human error and 
systems theory combined with more contemporary theory about organizing highly reliable systems 
has inspired the development of a novel framework to define Latent Organizational Risk.   
Methods  
Based on this framework, a practical method was developed to identify latent adaptive organizational 
risk using secondary data commonly collected by hospitals in the United States.  Clinical units with 
signals of adaptive risk were identified by triangulation of unit-level safety culture, employee 
engagement and patient experience data at five hospitals within a large academic medical center. 
After a feedback intervention, units with high adaptive risk were compared with units without 
adaptive risk in terms of their safety and teamwork climate.  The conceptual framework also 
informed development of a practice tool to guide leaders in assessing the latent patient safety risks 
associated with their strategic and financial decisions.  Likewise, the tool encouraged leaders to design 
appropriate mitigation strategies to reduce the technical and adaptive risks that may be created by or 
hinder successful improvement efforts.  
Results 
 
Data from 356 units in five hospitals across the Johns Hopkins Health System were subjected to the 
triangulation methodology.  Sixteen units were determined to be at high latent adaptive risk.  
Significant improvements in safety and teamwork climate were realized in those units following a 




care leaders to proactively identify downstream risks of high level leadership decisions, and to 
develop habits for high reliability organizing.    
Conclusions 
 
For health care to achieve a level of safety commensurate with high reliability industries, fundamental 
changes are needed in how care processes are planned and organized.   One key challenge ahead for 
health care leaders will be the adoption of new leadership habits to achieve more reliable and safe 
health care.  An essential role for health leaders will be the analysis of existing data sources to 
identify, understand and mitigate risk of patient harm.  Using the methods and tools outlined in this 
thesis, leaders will be able to expand their capacity to create the safe delivery systems our patients 
need and deserve.    
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Manuscript One:  Latent Organizational Risk: A Conceptual Framework for 
Understanding Leaders’ Role in Human Error 
 
This manuscript outlines a conceptual framework for understanding the role played by organizational 
conditions in creating latent risk conducive to frontline care provider mistakes.  Inspired by classic 
theories of human error, organizational accidents, and high reliability, this novel construct is a 
synthesis of these theories, which provides the foundation of this thesis, as well as future study.  
Recognizing that organizational risk is created at many levels, this manuscript focuses on the risk 
spawned from the upper echelons of an organization that manifests in the organizational culture and 
at the frontlines of care. Awareness of the origin of these risks will build a deeper understanding of 
the etiology of preventable harm and strategies to prevent unsafe acts by frontline caregivers. 
Manuscript Two: Assessing Latent Adaptive Organizational Risk: A Practical 
Approach 
 
Building on the concepts described in manuscript one, this paper outlines a method for using 
commonly available secondary data to identify signals of clinical units at risk.  A triangulation 
methodology is described, which integrates three different data sources: unit-level safety culture, 
employee engagement, and patient experiences.  Leaders accountable for the performance of units at 
risk received a leadership feedback intervention, followed by analysis of improvements in safety and 
teamwork climate scores post-intervention.  While units whose leaders received the interventions 
made statistically significant improvements over units without the intervention, no differences were 
seen after controlling for baseline scores.  Despite limitations of this analysis, it demonstrates how 





Manuscript Three: Latent Risk Assessment Tool for Leaders: 
Implications for Practice and Policy 
 
To date, interventions to improve quality of care and patient safety have been targeted to the sharp 
end of care delivery through standardized work and focus on delivering evidence-based care.  Few 
tools exist to help leaders systematically identify the latent risk created from decisions made at the 
higher levels of an organization.  This paper describes a tool designed for use by leaders that enables 
them to assess and mitigate latent risks before implementation of organizational change.  An example 
case illustrates how the tool might be used.   
Conclusions 
 
The adoption of new leadership habits to achieve more reliable and safe health care will be a 
challenge for health care leaders in the years ahead.  This thesis introduces new lenses through which 
leaders can consider their role in creation of safe delivery systems.  Using existing data sources to 
identify, understand, and mitigate risk of patient harm is a fundamental role for health leaders.  The 
methods and tools outlined in this work expands health care leaders’ capacity to ensure safe health 
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The study of medical errors in health care and strategies to prevent harm has been the subject of 
intense analysis and debate for more than fifteen years.  The focus has largely been on interventions 
to reduce harm caused at the point of care delivery.  Less focus has been devoted to reduction of risk 
produced at the distal leadership levels of an organization.  This paper synthesizes existing theoretical 
models to help explain and understand the role health care leaders’ play in creating, identifying and 
mitigating latent risk at the frontlines of care.    
Methods: 
Drawing on principles of high reliability, theory of human error, and an organizational accident 
model, a framework was developed to explain the connection between frontline caregiver behavior 
and the organizational conditions that increase risk for error.  The concept of Latent Organizational 
Risk is described with examples of how organizational conditions are created to produce such risk. 
Discussion:  
The Latent Organizational Risk model provides a novel framework to base future study of health 
care leadership and practice.  With a more proactive understanding of latent risk, methods and tools 









Since publication of the landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) report in 2000, To Err is 
Human 1, marginal and debatable progress has been made in preventing harm resulting from medical 
errors.  Efforts to improve safety over the past sixteen years have focused largely on clinicians and 
sharp-end errors in care delivery. Unfortunately, too often the acts of individuals that become the 
focus of investigation rather than the risks within the system that predisposed them to commit an 
error.  While some errors may be explained by individual behavior alone, others occur when well-
intentioned health care workers attempt to carry out their duties within a system that is not designed 
to prevent or defend against failure 2,3.   Demonstrable improvements in quality of care will require a 
fundamental change in how the health care delivery system is organized and managed.  Thought 
leaders in health care are turning to high reliability science for strategies to chart a future course in 
which health care delivery is as reliable and safe as nuclear power and high speed railroad industries. 
Organizing work systems to anticipate, contain and recover from mistakes is foundational to 
achieving reliability 4.  The mindful organizing habits of high reliability organization (HRO) leaders 
enable the identification of latent and manifest threats followed by quick responses to them 5.  Yet, 
such practices in health care have not been broadly adopted by health care leaders, nor health care 
workers in general.  
For health care to organize more similarly to HROs, more proactive leadership and 
management habits are required.  Unfortunately, health care leaders lack practical strategies to 
identify risks, and often fail to recognize how their decisions contribute to or defend against risks to 
patients created by such decisions.   Prominent safety experts such as James Reason and Charles 
Vincent have offered theoretical models examining how accidents occur in an organization and 
leadership’s role in addressing system problems.6-8  The overarching goal of this applied thesis is to 
build on and synthesize existing conceptual models to explain the relationship between latent 




by defining the concept of latent organizational risk, discussing the theoretical grounding for this 
definition, and then present a conceptual framework articulating key antecedents and potential 
outcomes of latent organizational risk. Finally, we offer possible practical implications and a series of 
future research directions for this framework for health care leaders.   Drawing on theory, this paper 
describes a unifying conceptual framework for understanding latent organizational risks that coalesce 
to create conditions ripe for errors that have the potential to result in patient harm. 
Theoretical Background and Grounding 
 
The theoretical foundation for the concept of latent organizational risk derives from 
Vincent’s adaptation of Reason’s organizational accident theory 8, which described human error and 
the organizational processes that contribute to unwanted incidents. We also draw on Ronald 
Heifetz’s transformational adaptive leadership theory to provide a perspective of effective problem 
identification and change management strategies9,10. We acknowledge that transformational 
leadership models like Heifetz’s, while popular over the past quarter-century, remain largely 
underdeveloped and lack empirical validation11.  We recognize the lack of empirical evidence for 
these models, nevertheless our framework builds upon practices widely embraced by and used in 
health care to provide a useful construct for understanding latent organizational risk.  Despite 
drawbacks, these theories have been chosen because of their wide application in implementation of 
patient safety and quality interventions12.   
Reason’s cognitive psychology theory of organizational accidents points to latent system 
failures as the precursor to errors that may contribute to accidents 6,7,13.  He categorizes failures 
within a system as either active or latent, which can be “distinguished both by who committed the 
failures and by the time they take to have a serious impact upon the integrity of the system” 7 p.223.  
Active failures in health care occur at the sharp-end, or when the clinicians closest to the patient 
interact with the hazardous processes in carrying out their care delivery responsibilities in which the 




intentioned but inadequately planned decisions at the higher levels of a health care system – or blunt-
end – by regulators, managers, administrative leaders, suppliers, or policy makers; often with a delayed 
impact 14.   
Vincent’s organization accident model shown in Figure 1 3,8,15, illustrates the trajectory of 
circumstances leading up to an incident, and how latent failures contribute to human error that can 
result in an unexpected incident.  To conceptualize how an incident occurs, Vincent suggests that 
latent failures may be created by the organizational culture, operational processes, or management 
decisions.    Risks are created anywhere within the system and lie dormant until the right conditions 
converge to produce error- and violation-prone conditions.  These conditions contribute to unsafe 
acts made by clinicians at the sharp end of care.  While defenses are often employed to prevent such 
error from reaching the patient, the effectiveness of these strategies vary widely.  Reason’s metaphor 
of aligning holes in Swiss cheese illustrates these unreliable defenses and barriers16. 
Reason describes latency in terms of “failures” suggesting a process has not gone according 
to plan.  In this paper we will refer to the vulnerabilities created by latent conditions as “risk”, 
implying that the potential for failure exists.  Latent risks are generally rooted in the behaviors, 
decisions, and norms perpetuated by managers and senior leaders of an organization.  In health care, 
such risks may be created by changes in resource allocation, supply chain, patient volume, or 
technology.   Because front line staff may not be aware of these changes in their system, managers 
and leaders play an essential role in identifying and mitigating the risks.  
Weick and Sutcliffe describe HROs as having cognitive and behavioral norms of respectful 
interactions, heedful interrelations, and a mindful infrastructure – all required to achieve reliable 
performance.17,18  In contrast to Reason and Vincent’s “failure” centered model, Weick and 
Sutcliffe’s high reliability theory offers a more positive valanced approach to understanding the 
organizational norms required to succeed.  The principles of a mindful infrastructure support 




failure; (2) reluctance to simplify; (3) sensitivity to operations; (4) commitment to resilience; and (5) 
deference to expertise 17,18.  This model is a more integrated conceptualization of the adaptive and 
technical components of an organization without suggesting specific error causation.  Nonetheless, it 
does reinforce the role of culture in organizational performance and offers specific organizing 
principles that will drive performance and defend against failure.   
To explore mitigation strategies, we looked to Heifetz’s adaptive leadership theory, which 
distinguishes between the technical and adaptive nature of organizational problems 9,10.  Technical 
problems have a known, specific solution with skilled individuals who know their role in the path to 
resolving the issue.  When an elevator malfunctions, for example, a skilled mechanic is immediately 
dispatched to fix it and prevent injury to passengers. If the mechanic cannot fix the elevator, a clear 
path for escalation and resolution is defined, with the goal of restoring safe elevator function.  
Adaptive problems, however, are not as clearly understood; nor is there known solutions and specific 
people to fix them.  Solving adaptive problems requires leadership to seek solutions that engage 
stakeholders, facilitate learning, and encourage new ideas for problem resolution 9,10.  In contrast, 
gathering a group of stakeholders to discuss how to fix the elevator would not be an efficient and 
effective means to address the technical problem.  While the problem-solving necessary to resolve 
the elevator malfunction may also include adaptive solutions that require a leader to consider the 
socio-cultural environment of their mechanics, the example is intended to illustrate technical 
problems.  Although, an adaptive approach may be appropriate to address a problem such as high 
employee turnover.  While the problem may have a technical component (e.g., wages), it may also be 
related to issues rooted in the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the organization and its employees.    
These two types of problems and their unique solutions align with the solutions described by 
Reason to defend against unsafe acts.7  While retraining, redesign, use of memory aids, and improved 
information may be effective technical defenses against errors, they may not be effective at mitigating 




morale and safety culture are recommended to reduce violations, but might not help with error 
reduction.  
Understanding the contrast and interdependence between the adaptive and technical nature 
of organizational risks and the different tools required to address them is critical in effective risk 
mitigation.    Heifetz postulates that “the most common cause of failure in leadership is produced by 
treating adaptive challenges as if they were technical.” 10 p. 19   This difference in the nature of 
organizational problems is particularly important to consider as it applies to understanding latent risk 
and human error, and to developing mitigation strategies to reduce preventable harm in health care.   
 
A Framework for Defining Latent Organizational Risk 
 
The need for a synthesized model of latent organizational risk is based on three notions.  
First, the salience of the Reason and Vincent accident causation models for health care, especially 
their concept of latent risks.  Second, the importance of distinguishing technical and adaptive 
problems in organizations.  And third, the slow progress in reducing harm and the lack of leadership 
tools to consider latent risks of high-level decisions or lack of decisions.      
Inspired by these foundational models, we synthesized a conceptual framework for understanding 
latent organizational antecedents to unsafe acts characterized as latent organizational risk (Figure 2).  
Described in two parts, the concept of latent technical organizational risk is defined as conditions 
formed by management and policy decisions governing system design that create a work 
environment conducive to errors.  Latent adaptive organizational risk is defined as the conditions that 
manifest in the organizational culture, creating a work environment enabling socially oriented unsafe 
acts of violation.  These risks can be introduced at multiple levels of the organizations.  Hospitals, 
like all organizations, do not have one overall culture, rather levels of cascading sub-cultures, such as 




 Attention, memory, and knowledge-based errors align with latent technical risks in the 
model because these unsafe acts respond favorably to technical defenses such as workflow design, 
cognitive aids, better information sharing, and application of workload standards 7. The extent to 
which these technical defenses are implemented influences the risk to recover from error and prevent 
harm.  To date, these errors have largely been perceived to be the fault of the employee rather than 
fallible latent organizational decisions for which defenses were not developed.  One example, may be 
the selection and implementation plan for an electronic medical record system may introduce latent 
technical risks into a health care system.  
This framework suggests that violations are preceded by adaptive latent risks.  For example, 
poor morale on a unit creates an environment conducive to normalizing deviations from known best 
practices.  Prevention of these unsafe acts require changes in attitudes, beliefs, norms, morale, and 
safety culture in the local area where work is performed.  This dichotomous description of latency is 
meant to illustrate the contrasting origins of these unsafe acts.  In reality, both technical and adaptive 
risk may simultaneously precede significant untoward events.  Understanding both is critical to 
effective organizational learning. 
The organizational conditions outlined in Table 1 are adapted from Reason’s work 7 and 
help us understand some of the antecedents to technical and adaptive latent risks that can prompt 
unsafe acts.    Through active efforts to study and better understand the connection between these 
conditions and human behavior, we identify management practices that mitigate latent risk and create 
a favorable environment within which workers can succeed rather than fail.   
The Latent Organizational Risk model describes a framework to understand more 
systemically how organizational culture, managerial decisions, and operational processes influence 
human error.  Theoretically, the antecedents of latent risk (Table 1) create conditions in which unsafe 
acts of human error and violation may transpire.  Consider the downstream implications of financial 




without frontline input to an assessment of risk.  Yet the conditions created by these decisions are 
conducive to technical human errors of cognition by frontline caregivers.   
Likewise, the implications of culture, be it organizational, departmental, unit-based or role-
based, are often in the blind spot of leaders, yet are palpable to frontline employees.  When 
organizational norms do not support strong morale, value standard work and the growth of safety 
culture, violation condoning norms are cultivated.  Under these conditions, latent adaptive risk is 
created and organizational values in quality are compromised.   
Identifying Latent Risks 
 
In order to use this framework for identification of latent risks, health care leaders must 
consider the contributions of their strategic, resource, and operational decisions, as well as their 
personal behavior in creating risk-laden conditions.  The identification of latent technical risks will 
require organizational capacity to investigate events using a human factors and systems engineering 
approach.  “Human factors is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of 
interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, 
principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance” 19.  “Systems engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a team 
effort forming a structured development process that proceeds from concept to production to 
operation” 20.  Usability testing, sound workflow design, and both macro- and micro-ergonomic 
approaches are some strategies to identify and mitigate technical risks within an organization.  The 
Joint Commission recently identified “human factors” as a leading contributing factor to reported 
sentinel events 21.  With this recognition, the health care industry has great opportunity to understand 
the interface between humans and work processes, furthering our understanding of latent technical 
risks.   
Identifying latent adaptive organizational risk will require diverse sources of intelligence to 




consumers of their services – patients.   This may involve quantitative measures of employee 
reported safety climate or employee engagement, or less measurable or structured information from 
discussions, focus groups, or comments offered through surveys or observing behaviors.  For 
example, an organization’s culture might be defined by the worst behavior leaders tolerate.  Leaders 
often tolerate bad behavior from physicians who bring in large amounts of revenue, despite evidence 
that disruptive behavior negatively affects patient satisfaction, outcomes, and costs of care 22,23.   
Costs of adverse events, nurse turnover, malpractice suits are the financial consequences of such 
behavior.   In addition, compliance, organizational reputation and consumer confidence can be 
compromised by tolerance of chronic disruptive interactions 24.  While disruptive physicians cause 
the problems, the latent adaptive risk lies with leadership’s encouragement, incentivizing, ignoring, or 
tolerating such disruptive behavior.    
Mitigating latent adaptive organizational risks will require that an organization foster an 
environment that supports open communication and invites frontline providers to voice their 
concerns about patient safety and respond accordingly to mitigate the risk of harm to patients.  This 
culture must be cultivated at all levels and pertinent areas of the organization and all roles, including 
governing boards that chart a strategic course;  chief financial officers who allocate financial 
resources for care delivery;  human resource professionals who guide hiring and separation practices;  
chief operating officers who define service lines and operational systems; or chief information 
officers who determine the health information technology deployment strategies.  Latent risks are 
created and evident in each of these spheres of leadership within health care.  
Practice Implications 
 
Health care leaders must develop the skills and habits that lead to consideration of latent 
adaptive and technical factors when making decisions.  While this model can support their efforts, a 
number of barriers need to be resolved.  Such barriers include training in safe system design, 




Financial pressures can obstruct efforts to mitigate such risks while time pressures can create urgency 
that foreshadows risk reduction.  For example, many health systems implemented electronic health 
records with poor usability and significant latent risks, yet were largely unaware of the risks of both a 
technical and adaptive nature.  Investments in human factors professionals to help design and assess 
system vulnerabilities is lagging.  Health care leaders need to conduct exploratory problem-solving 
more transparently and explicitly balance production pressures and finances with safety.    Too often, 
health care workers conceptualize safety as binary -- safe or unsafe -- rather than as a continuous 
variable where leaders make explicit and transparent decisions regarding how safe they can afford to 
be.  Health care has a long way to go towards empirically quantifying risks and benefits of safety 
decisions.    Finally, health care leaders and safety researchers need to integrate all quality and safety 
efforts into an operating management system, viewing safety not as a project but as a performance 
system 25.    While some management practices, such as Lean methods, are associated with improved 
organizational performance 26, limited evidence demonstrates specific management practices that 
reduce latent risks – particularly those that influence resource allocation, safety culture, staff training 
programs, supervision, and adoption of new technology.  
Research Directions 
 
In order for health care to make improvements in safety that surpass those made in the last 
15 years and resemble HROs, it is essential that new lenses be created to understand how errors and 
patient harm continue to occur.  The conceptual framework we outlined in this paper offers several 
avenues for future applied research.  First, it will be important to study how antecedents and 
contributing factors identified in our framework coalesce to produce conditions of latent adaptive or 
technical risk, and how those risks influence error and the ability to recover from error.  It will be 
important to validate the framework and determine if errors or violations occur more often in the 




identify the factors that create latent risks and conditions in which frontline caregivers are more 
prone to unsafe acts.    
Second, for this conceptual framework to be validated, methods to identify and measure 
latent adaptive and technical risks must be created and tested.  Once tools are available to identify 
risk, further examination of associations with frontline caregiver behavior and unsafe acts will 
strengthen this construct.     
Third, implementation science might apply this framework to better understand 
organizational conditions that improve compliance with known best practices to prevent harm.  It 
will be important to study how an organizational culture preoccupied with safety can be created and 
sustained, like that of high reliability organizations, to reduce provider violations that may result in 
patient harm.  For example, good hand hygiene habits are a global initiative but remain an area of 
potential violations. Higher hand hygiene compliance has been associated with positive safety 
culture27.  Similarly, social cohesion among unit teams has been associated with greater compliance 
with hand hygiene practices 28.   Understanding the latent risks that undermine these best practices 
will help health care leaders establish a culture that values and rewards safe practice.  Many hospitals 
dutifully collect safety culture data to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements, but 
might not use these data with a learning orientation aimed at identifying adaptive risk and strategies 
for improvement within their units, departments and organization.   
Fourth, health care management research should focus on the impact of “blunt-end” 
decision making and system design on “sharp-end” behavior choices.   For example, take a decision 
made about resource allocation and examine how caregiver behavior is impacted.  
Fifth, human factors research is needed to advance the usability of devices, equipment and 
other technology to reduce technical latent risks and errors.  It is imperative to understand the 
human interface with technology if we are to keep patients safe, especially with the widespread 




systems.  With human factors being the most frequent contributor to sentinel events reported to The 
Joint Commission, there are significant opportunities to look at how our medical equipment, devices, 
and processes introduce risk 21. 
Finally, human resources research is needed to identify the practices that support allocation 
of sufficient staffing resources and the reduction of workplace stress, and provide appropriate 
supervision.  These are important building blocks to a safe, reliable, and resilient system -- not just an 
expense that needs to be managed.  In a human system, like health care, our most valuable resources 
are the clinicians and support staff who render care.  Understanding and mitigating the latent risks 




The failure of health care leaders to systematically identify, mitigate, and defend against 
latent risks explains, in part, the slow progress toward reducing patient harm. It is incumbent upon 
health care leaders to be mindful of the risks and consequences their decisions and practices may 
create. Our framework can provide the lenses they need to accomplish these objectives and offer a 
new perspective on medical error that could help health care achieve the same safety status as other 
high reliability industries.    
Organizing for highly reliable care requires that leaders gather diverse sources of information 
to create a nuanced picture of their organization.  It also requires that leaders understand safety 
science to distinguish between adaptive and technical problems, and the errors or violations that 
these problems create.   It requires leaders to explicitly consider risks and benefits to patients’ safety 
and financial performance of their decisions.   Leaders are responsible for understanding and 
mitigating the latent risks of the complex systems of care created by the decisions and strategic 
direction of the organization.  The conceptual framework set out in this paper serves as a starting 




practices with the people most proximal to the delivery of care and the organizational mission, a 
more sophisticated understanding of the interdependency within our health care organizations is 





















Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1.  Organizational Conditions for Unsafe Acts 7 
 
Antecedents to Technical Latent Risks Antecedents to Adaptive Latent Risks 
 High workload 
 Inadequate knowledge, ability or 
experience 
 Poor user interface design 
 Insufficient supervision or instruction 
 Stressful environment 
 Individual resilience and mental state 
 Organizational change 
 Procurement and supply chain policies 
 Lack of Safety Culture 
 Poor morale 
 Overly optimistic beliefs about bad 
outcomes 
 Violation-condoning norms 
 Hazardous attitudes 
 Meaningless or ambiguous rules 
 Lack of understanding of latent risks in 
leaders decision 
 Failure to explicitly consider and 
communicate risks injected into a 
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APPENDIX A1: Definition of Terms 
 
Term Definition 
Adaptive Capable of modifying to adjust to local culture and norms. 
 
Error Occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails 
to achieve its intended outcome. 6,29 
 
Failure Omission of occurrence or performance; specifically :  a failing to perform a 
duty or expected action 30 
 
Risk Exposure to events which may threaten or damage the organization and its 
interests 29 
 
Technical Of known mechanisms of operation, knowledge and resolution. 
 




























Objectives:  The objectives of this paper are to describe a method to identify areas of latent adaptive 
organizational risk in hospital settings using secondary analysis of employee and patient reported 
survey data, and to study the association of leadership feedback about this risk with unit level safety 
and teamwork climate.    
Study Design:  Based on the theoretical underpinnings, conceptual framework, and literature review 
described in manuscript one, a two part design was used to achieve the study objectives.  First, a 
deductive, qualitative subject matter expert driven process was created to identify patterns suggestive 
of unit-level latent adaptive organizational risk (LAR).  This triangulation analysis was conducted 
using unit-level safety culture data collected from frontline care providers, employee engagement 
survey data collected from hospital employees, and patient reported care experience data collected 
during Fall 2013 from five hospitals across the Johns Hopkins Health System.  Secondly, a 
retrospective study using unit-level safety and teamwork climate scores was designed to examine the 
impact of a feedback intervention on high-LAR units after two years.   
Interventions: Leaders operationally responsible for the units identified at high latent adaptive risk 
were provided feedback resulting from this analysis.  Thereafter, leaders were expected to report their 
plans for local intervention to the health system governing board.  Local interventions included 
leadership change, physical unit improvement, team training, and staffing changes. 
Outcome Measures: Unit safety and teamwork climate scores were examined for change after the 
feedback intervention was conducted using survey data collected in 2015, which was compared to the 




Results: Average changes in safety and teamwork climate scores between the two survey 
administrations were compared using paired samples t-tests.   Between 2013 and 2015, units at risk 
had significantly higher average changes in safety climate scores (mean changelow LAR = -0.001, mean 
changehigh LAR = 0.14, t = -3.01, p=0.0029). Teamwork climate changes for high risk units were also 
significantly greater than low risk units (mean changelow LAR = -0.01, mean changehigh LAR = 0.18, t = -
4.09, p=0.0001). 
A chi-square test of independence demonstrated a significantly greater proportion of high LAR work 
areas (53%) with an increase of ten percentage points or more in safety climate scores compared to 
non-LAR work areas (26%, x2 = 5.24, p = 0.02)   Additionally, a significantly larger proportion of 
high LAR work areas (80%) showed large improvements in teamwork climate scores compared to 
non-LAR work areas. (22%, x2 = 25.42, p = <0.0001).  
Multivariate linear regression was used to examine potential confounders of changes in safety and 
teamwork climate scores.  No significant differences in safety climate change scores and teamwork 
climate change scores were observed based on unit type or unit size.  Controlling for baseline scores, 
linear regression showed no significant difference in teamwork and safety change scores for LAR and 
non-LAR units. 
Conclusions:  This analysis provides some preliminary evidence that existing data sources may be 
used to identify units that have a common signal of adaptive risk.  Feedback to leaders and custom 
interventions at the unit level demonstrated significant improvements in safety and teamwork 
climate.  After controlling for baseline scores, no significant differences were between LAR and non-
LAR units.  Future research could strengthen this analysis by validating the concept of latent adaptive 
risk through examination of relationships with other unit level safety data and by addressing 







Seventeen years after the landmark Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human, debate 
continues about whether health care delivery in America is any safer now than when the report was 
released in 20001.  The initial report that publicized the epidemic of medical error called for 
mechanisms to monitor care and improve outcomes, and for changes in management practices, by 
learning from other safety vigilant industries.   Health care has typically targeted the more visible 
problems, such as hospital-acquired infections and blood clots.  One recent report claims there 
between 2010 and 2013, there were nine percent fewer hospital acquired conditions, saving as many 
as 50,000 lives and $12 billion 31.  However, conflicting studies claim that as many as 400,000 people 
continue to die annually from preventable medical mistakes32.    Less tangible recommendations to 
change leadership and management practices have not been well studied, likely because they lack 
specificity and clear direction.  
Thought leaders are turning to safety strategies employed by high reliability industries in 
which risk is proactively identified and mitigated 4.    They also emphasize that we must create 
methods to measure conditions that create safety rather than limit ourselves to reactionary measures 
of specific harmful events 33. These ultra-safe industries proactively identify and mitigate latent 
hazards within their own organizations, seeking out weak signals from a variety of data sources to 
identify unsafe conditions that could lead to harm 34.    These latent hazards are created by decisions 
made at the distal end of an organizational hierarchy by those whose ability to see the downstream 
impact of their decisions is thwarted by the distance between their role and patient care and the delay 
in time required for the failure to manifest 7. Such hazards lurk in decisions and strategies about 
resource allocation, human resource practices, regulation and policy 14.  To date, practical approaches 
to proactively integrate quality and safety data in health care have lacked vision and defined methods 




After a public incident that prompted deep and thoughtful organizational introspection, the 
Johns Hopkins Medicine governing board requested an analysis of organizational risk.  The methods 
to identify risk described in this paper were developed with the goal of identifying unit-level signs of 
adaptive risks.  This examination of existing unit level data across the health system was conducted to 
identify patterns of performance and to inform senior leaders of potential latent risks.  Subsequent 
intervention and evaluation suggests that such analysis, feedback, and local intervention may 
contribute to significant improvement of safety and teamwork climate.   
Background 
 
Work by Michael West 35 revealed that the degree to which employees are engaged and 
perceive their workplace as safe is associated with complications and mortality of the patients for 
whom they care.   While the West study was conducted as part of a research study rather than 
hospital operations, it suggests that unit characteristics, local unit culture, and patient reported 
experience could serve as a form of business intelligence that leaders can use to proactively assess 
and mitigate adaptive risks in their organization. Despite this evidence and the uptake of business 
intelligence strategies in other industries, health care rarely seeks to proactively identify risks or to 
triangulate data from a variety of sources to identify risks.    Nevertheless, in seeking to be a high 
reliability organization, the ability to proactively identify risky units and identify interventions to 
mitigate those risks offers a promising strategy to improve patient outcomes in health care. To date, 
this approach focuses on risks within a patient care area and has not linked those risks to leadership 
behaviors.  We hypothesize that identifying risks within units and linking those risks to leadership 
behaviors will provide health care leaders with valid and actionable areas to improve safety.     
With external agencies such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services exceeding 
1,700 defined measures of health care quality 36, many data are collected by hospitals to meet 
regulatory requirements or to inform specific operational priorities, such as patient safety culture and 




these measures of performance and organizational context, yet little is known about the relationships 
between and among the concepts. Metrics are often developed independent of one another and are 
often administered and analyzed in a siloed manner.  While little work to date has examined the 
associations or patterns among the diverse array of data collected, moderate associations have been 
recognized between safety culture and employee engagement 37.  While these surveys and data 
collections have become a regular practice of many health care organizations, each set of results and 
interventions are often considered in isolation of the other, narrowing a leader’s ability to identify 
areas of particular organizational risk.   
Hence, the goal of this paper is to describe a practical approach to using existing sources of 
operational data to identify adaptive latent sources of risk for which focused interventions can be 
designed.   We describe how one large academic medical center and health system attempted, as part 
of its broader patient safety efforts, to triangulate multiple sources of data in order to identify 
adaptive signals of latent risk within units.  We demonstrate the operational and scientific value of 
triangulating three sources of existing data to identify subtle yet significant sources of organizational 
risk. 
At Johns Hopkins Medicine, patient safety efforts to prevent patient harm are organized into 
three categories: risky providers, risky units and risky systems 38.  In this paper we focus on a method 
to identify risky units.  This novel strategy assesses risk in an acute hospital setting where the cultural, 
workforce and patient care norms and beliefs may create a risky, error and violation prone 
environment or a resilient, respectful and collaborative environment.  Capitalizing on existing 
operational data sources, we describe a triangulation methodology designed to identify patient care 
unit-level risk in a large academic hospital and health system.  Use of existing data respects the effort 
by employees and patients who are the sources of the information, while making productive use of 
organizational investments in these surveys. Through leadership accountability and local 





Theoretical grounding & how we operationalized latent adaptive risk 
 
Organizational Accident Theory 8 explains that untoward events are the result of systemic 
failures that predispose frontline workers to committing error.  These failures include latent 
conditions that are often the result of decisions made by leaders without appropriate mitigation of 
downstream risks.  Among the latent conditions are poor safety climate and poor morale that Reason 
suggests can predispose workers to commit unsafe acts of violation 7.   Heifetz distinguishes 
organizational problems as either adaptive, requiring a social change, or technical, requiring a cognitive 
solution 9.  With these theories as a foundation, a model of Latent Adaptive Organizational Risk was 
developed and used as the foundation for this study.  “Latent adaptive organizational risk is defined as 
the conditions that manifest in the organizational culture, creating a work environment enabling 
socially oriented unsafe acts of violation” (Manuscript 1, Doctoral Dissertation, Lori A. Paine, 2017).   
Methods 
 
Based on this theoretical framework, three existing sources of data were integrated to 
identify signals of unit-level adaptive risk:  safety culture, employee engagement, and patient 
experience. 
We conducted this retrospective analysis to identify unit risk using data collected in 2013 
from three sources at five acute care hospitals within the Johns Hopkins Health System.   To identify 
latent adaptive risk (LAR), we triangulated unit-level indicators for the following: (1) safety culture; 
(2) employee engagement; and (3) patient experience (See Table 1).  To examine the effect of 
feedback provided to senior organizational leaders about these risks, we analyzed changes in safety 






Data Sources and Measures 
 
Safety Culture Survey   
Safety culture is defined as the often unspoken beliefs, attitudes and values of an 
organization’s membership regarding the pursuit of safety 13. Organizational measurement of safety 
culture using valid and reliable instruments was highlighted as one best practice in the 1999 IOM 
report 1 and now required by The Joint Commission.  However, the evidence linking patient 
outcomes to safety culture and interventions to improve it is limited 39.  The Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SAQ) is administered to collect frontline care provider reported perceptions of safety 
culture.  This survey is valid, reliable, and includes six domains: safety climate, teamwork climate, 
stress recognition, working conditions, perceptions of local management, and perceptions of senior 
management40.  For this analysis, we examined the safety and teamwork domain scores as well as 
individual survey items focused on psychological safety (i.e., comfort and willingness to speak up and 
speak out) (See Table 2 for specific criteria).  The safety domain measures the perceived level of 
strong and proactive organizational commitment to safety within a given work area or work group.  
The teamwork domain quantifies perceptions of the quality of collaboration between personnel 
within a given work area.   
Safety culture assessments are conducted every 18-24 months within clinical units across the 
health system.  Multidisciplinary clinical teams and units whose work supports clinical care are 
included.  The survey is administered over a one-month period.  Within 4-6 weeks, unit level domain 
and question results are returned to units with at least a 40% response rate.   
Survey respondents score each item on a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 
5=strongly agree).  Domain scale scores are calculated as the percent of all unit respondents with 
individual domain scores of greater than 4 or 5.  Reports include unit specific domain and item 
results as well as hospital wide results for comparison.  Debriefing sessions with unit teams are 




a process adapted from the Team Check-up Tool 41. More than 14,000 health care team members, 
representing teams from over 400 work areas and work groups across the health system, take part in 
the survey.  Data for clinical units with response rates ≥ 40% and represented by at least five 
respondents were included in this analysis. (N=356)  Work areas included in this analysis had mean 
survey response rates of 77% in 2013 (SD = 16.4) and 74% in 2015 (SD = 16.7).  Response rates did 
not differ significantly between the high latent adaptive risk and non-risk study group.  (See Table 3)  
Employee Engagement Survey   
The Gallup Q12 questionnaire was used to evaluate employee engagement 42.    An online 
version of the tool was used to collect responses from more than 12,000 individuals representing 
over 650 work groups in five hospitals across the system.   Mean scores are reported by groups based 
on the managerial structure throughout the organization.   In addition to these unit mean scores, 
specific questions related to employees feeling able and supported to speak up and speak out about 
concerns were identified and used in this analysis; as was done in the safety culture assessment.  
Average hospital level response rates among four hospitals for which summary statistics were 
available were 69.4%, (62.6%, 73.7%, SD = 0.05).  Response rate data were not available for one of 
the five hospitals in the health system.  See Appendix A2 for hospital-specific detail. 
Patient Care Experience Survey   
For this analysis, the Press Ganey survey was used to quantify patient perspectives of service 
and communication.43  The patient reported experience of care outcome is gathered through 
completed post discharge or post encounter surveys.  The Press Ganey Overall Score percentile 
rankings were used as risk criteria.  This score is derived from responses of zero to 10 to the question 
“What number would you use to rate this hospital during your stay?” Zero is the worst hospital 
possible and 10 is the best hospital possible. Surveys are mailed to a random sample of 50% of 
patients with recent hospital admissions or ambulatory visits.  Data are collected continuously 




1, 2 and 3 in the fiscal year corresponding with the Safety Culture and Employee Engagement 
collection.  During the year, 66,014 patients were surveyed with 17,919 responses.  The average 
hospital response from patients was 26.9% (20.7%, 31.5%, SD = 0.04).  Detailed hospital response 
rates are available in Appendix A2. 
 
Triangulation Methodology for Identifying Risky Units 
 
“Triangulation involves using multiple data sources in an investigation to produce 
understanding”. 44  For the purposes of this analysis, triangulation refers to a deductive, qualitative, 
subject matter expert driven process.  Units with data from at least two of the 3 sources (Safety 
Culture, Employee Engagement and Patient Experience) were included in the analysis. The process 
of triangulation began by identifying the operationally relevant LAR criteria for each criteria domain.  
Using existing evidence and expertise, subject matter experts (SMEs) for each survey defined the 
threshold past which they would consider a unit “risky” (Table 2).   Each SME then applied the 
criteria to their respective dataset and identified the units at risk in that domain in each hospital.   
  With three separate subsets of at-risk units identified by each survey, SMEs matched units 
across surveys to determine which units met risk criteria in multiple datasets.  The number of 
domains meeting the risk criteria were summed for each unit to create a LAR score between 0 and 3 
(0=No Risk; 1=Low LAR; 2=Moderate LAR; 3=High LAR) (Figure 1).   The frequency distribution 
of unit scores in these categories was LAR 0 = 339, LAR 1 = 1, LAR 2 = 11, LAR 3 = 5.  (Figure 2) 
To determine the face validity of the risk assessments, the director of safety discussed 









A three-part intervention was applied to units identified as risky with LAR scores of 2 and 3.  
In the first part, safety leaders, including the senior vice president for patient safety and quality and 
director of patient safety for Johns Hopkins Medicine, sent a summary report to the department 
chairs to which the unit aligned in the academic hospitals or to the hospital president in the 
community hospitals where the unit was located. The report explained the concept of latent adaptive 
risks of an organization, the risk analysis, and the results. The safety leaders subsequently met with 
the department leaders individually to discuss the results, understand their perceptions, and explore 
improvement plans. Upon receiving feedback on results, departmental and hospital leaders were not 
surprised by the results for nearly all LAR positive units, acknowledging past concern in these areas.   
Feedback on the report from department directors and hospital presidents was generally positive and 
leaders welcomed having additional data to validate needed changes.   Each leader committed to 
create an action plan for improvement. 
The second part of the intervention included a variety of local unit interventions included in 
each action plan.    Interventions in each area varied based on the unique factors associated with staff 
perceptions of safety, teamwork and engagement as well as patient experience.  Themes of leadership 
and resources were among the most common areas of required intervention.   Workflow and physical 
unit changes were also observed.  Use of daily huddles and team training were cited as interventions 
to improve communication. (see Table 4)  Leaders reported out plans and progress at a subsequent 
board meeting.  Following interventions, preliminary results of this change analysis were reported.   
The third part of the intervention involved governing board accountability.  Within two 
months, the risky units were presented to the Johns Hopkins Medicine Board of Trustees at a Board 
Quality and Safety Committee meeting and the presidents and department directors presented their 




Data Inclusion and Exclusion for Change Analysis 
 
All units that participated in the 2013 Safety Culture Assessment (N=404) were eligible for 
the triangulation analysis (see Figure 2).  Because of low response rates and therefore no reported 
data, 48 units were excluded from the change analysis.  Of the remaining 356 units, 339 met none of 
the three risk criteria.  Low LAR units were identified as meeting one or none of the criteria (n=340 
units).   Sixteen units were identified as high LAR units.   The change analysis required comparable 
data across the two study years of 2013 and 2015 that excluded one LAR positive and 43 LAR 
negative units.  The final change analysis included 312 units representing 297 LAR negative units and 
fifteen LAR positive units.   A diverse set of positive LAR units included four inpatient units, three 
outpatient clinics, three diagnostic or treatment areas, two emergency departments, two labor and 
delivery units, and two hospital service areas. 
Methods for Change Analysis 
 
To evaluate the impact of this feedback we examined changes in patient safety culture scores 
between 2013 and 2015.  Our primary dependent variables were teamwork and safety climate scores 
measured by the patient safety culture assessment using the corresponding SAQ domains.  The 
effectiveness of the feedback intervention was evaluated by comparing unit scores for teamwork and 
safety climate domains before the intervention, in 2013, to scores after the intervention, in 2015.   
Results were stratified by binary LAR scores 0 and 1 as non-LAR and scores 2 and 3 as high LAR.  
Mean unit domain scores were compared using a simple t-test.   Magnitude of improvement was 
assessed by examining units with significant improvements of ten percentage points or greater.  Chi 
square and Fisher’s exact tests were performed to determine if high LAR units differed from non-
LAR units in the degree of their improvement.  Multivariate linear regression was used to adjust for 







Average changes in safety and teamwork climate scores of high LAR and non-LAR negative 
units between the two survey administrations were compared using paired samples t-tests.   Between 
2013 and 2015, high LAR units had significantly higher average changes in safety climate scores 
(mean changelow LAR = -0.001, mean changehigh LAR = 0.14, t = -3.01, p=0.0029). Teamwork climate 
changes for high LAR units were also significantly greater than non-LAR units (mean changelow LAR = 
-0.01, mean changehigh LAR = 0.18, t = -4.09, p=0.0001). 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the difference between high 
LAR and non-LAR units that achieved greater than or equal to 10 percentage point increase in safety 
and teamwork climate scores between 2013 and 2015.   A significantly greater proportion of LAR 
positive work areas (53%) demonstrated an increase of ten percentage points or more in safety 
climate score compared to non-LAR work areas (26%, x2 = 5.24, p = 0.02).  Likewise, a significantly 
larger proportion of high LAR work areas (80%) showed large improvements in teamwork climate 
scores compared to non-LAR work areas. (22%, x2 = 25.42, p = <0.0001).  (Table 5.) 
Multivariate linear regression was used to examine work area type (inpatient, outpatient, 
other) and work area staff size (continuous) as potential confounders of changes in safety and 
teamwork climate scores.  Results did not demonstrate significant differences in the magnitude of 
safety climate change scores (Wald test F = 0.09, p=0.91) or teamwork climate change scores (Wald 
test F = 0.59, p=0.55) based on unit type.  Changes in safety climate and teamwork climate were also 
not significantly associated with unit size (safety climate:  β = 0.04, p=0.16) and (teamwork climate: β 
= .03, p=0.22), respectively.  Using linear regression to control for baseline scores, no significant 
difference was seen in teamwork change scores for high LAR and non-LAR units (Wald test F = 
0.33, p=0.72). Likewise, no significant difference was seen in safety change scores for high LAR and 






We used an SME-based triangulation method to identify units with employee and patient 
reported outcomes that suggest the presence of latent adaptive risk.  The use of a multifaceted 
intervention consisting of feedback of these unit scores to leaders, development of an improvement 
plan, and accountability to a governing board, resulted in demonstrable improvement in safety and 
teamwork climate scores.   In nearly all units, local clinical leadership was identified as a main 
contributor to the risk.  In some cases, the unit lacked named physician leaders and these were added 
as part of the improvement plan; in others leaders were replaced.  Staffing concerns were identified 
and addressed in units found to have resource challenges. Workflow changes and physical unit 
improvements were made in others.  Daily huddles and team training were interventions in other 
units struggling with communication issues. 
These findings are consistent with West’s research 35 demonstrating the correlation between 
risky units and patient outcomes.  Vincent also reports that significant improvements in safety will 
require integrating data sources and measures of risk into formal safety structures 33.  It is also 
consistent with recent research findings that strong management practices are associated with 
improved outcomes, yet such practices are not widely employed 26.   
There were a number of technical and operational challenges in conducting this work, 
including different cycle times for the surveys that rendered some data old at the time of analysis.  
We also faced difficulty matching units across datasets, as each survey was designed with slightly 
different unit structures. Yet this problem could be overcome with standardization of unit identifiers.  
We also learned that the time and resources required of SMEs to manually identify risky units is 
considerable and requires leadership support of their time to conduct this analysis.  
We recognize limitations to our study. First, the psychometrics of each survey vary making 
the validity and reliability of the overall methodology elusive. Nevertheless, the list of risky units had 




tests we could perform, which could bias our results. Third, the methods used to identify risky units 
could lead to misclassification of some units.  Still, the risk manager and senior leaders validated the 
risky units. Fourth, department and hospital leaders may have implemented other interventions that 
contributed to the improvement. Likewise, broader health system and hospital interventions may 
have been responsible for the improvement. Still, the overall health system and hospital improved 
much less. Fifth, we did not account for changes in unit characteristics and composition over time. 
Sixth, we cannot establish a causal relationship between our intervention and results with our study 
design. Further, LAR selection criteria of the study design likely led to a validity threat, as evidenced 
by a regression to the mean in the change score analysis.  Seventh, our study was conducted at an 
academic health system with a mature safety governance and management structure and culture.  
This may limit the generalizability of our results to other health care delivery settings.      
Nevertheless, our results have important practice implications.   This approach is informed 
by theory and demonstrates a practical, low burden method for identifying and mitigating latent risks 
in organizations. Reason suggests that poor safety culture and morale are preconditions of unsafe 
acts of violation 7.  A process such as that described in this paper offers a mechanism to proactively 
identify areas within an organization that are prone to violations that may cause patient harm.  
Mitigating patient safety risks in these units may require more adaptive than technical 
intervention10,12.   
A key finding of this study was the importance of and need for strong leadership and 
management.   Leaders in this study expressed gratitude for being provided data that provided them 
additional evidence to support difficult and necessary unit leadership changes.  Clinical leaders often 
find it difficult to hold their clinical leaders accountable for performance because they have a dual 
role as colleague and boss. High level (i.e., governing board) accountability for the adaptive and 




For leaders to be confident about the organization’s health and vulnerabilities, they must 
have quantitative and qualitative, technical and adaptive, hard and soft data 45.  While this may not be 
a familiar or comfortable approach, this diverse set of data will provide the most comprehensive 
picture of the organizational reality.   If a health care leader seeks to organize for high reliability, the 
information they gather and use for strategic planning and tactical management must include intrinsic 
wisdom of present and emerging sources of risk.  While most health care organizations collect such 
data, few methods have been proposed for synthesizing that is valuable and reportable to their 
governing boards.     
Conclusions 
 
As health care works toward high reliability, leaders must enhance their ability to proactively 
identify risks at the provider, unit, and organizational levels. In this paper, we described a novel 
method to identify risky units in hospitals and a practical management intervention.   Most of the risk 
reduction efforts involved changes in management (Table 4).  Broad application of this approach can 
improve safety culture in health care. Further research is needed to evaluate the association between 
improved culture and clinical outcomes, as well as the presence of latent adaptive risk and unsafe acts 
of violation by frontline care providers.  Other areas of exploration include validation of the criteria 
used to define risk and identification of additional data sources that may be relevant for identifying 












Tables & Figures 
 
Table 1.  Survey Domains and Items 
 





domain score  
(%) 
 
1. I would feel safe being treated here as a patient.  
2. Medical errors are handled appropriately in this work setting. 
3. I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding 
patient safety in this work setting. 
4. I receive appropriate feedback about my performance 
5. In this work setting, it is difficult to discuss errors. (reverse 
scored) 
6. I am encouraged by others in this work setting to report any 
patient safety concerns I may have. 
7. The culture in this work setting makes it easy to learn from the 
errors of others. 
Additional question included in the pilot subject matter expert (SME) 
high risk criteria 





1. My input is well received in this work setting.  
2. In this work setting, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a 
problem with patient care. (reverse scored) 
3. Disagreements in this work setting are resolved appropriately 
(i.e., not who is right, but what is best for the patient). 
4. I have the support I need from others in this work setting to 
care for patients. 
5. It is easy for personnel here to ask questions when there is 
something that they do not understand. 







Q01. I know what is expected of me at work. 
Q02. I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right. 




(Mean on 1-5 
scale) 
Q04. In the last seven days, I have received recognition or praise for 
doing good work. 
Q05. My supervisor, or someone at work, seems to care about me as a 
person. 
Q06. There is someone at work who encourages my development. 
Q07. At work, my opinions seem to count. 
Q08. The mission or purpose of my organization makes me feel my 
job is important. 
Q09. My fellow employees are committed to doing quality work.   
Q10. I have a best friend at work. 
Q11. In the last six months, someone at work has talked to me about 
my progress. 
Q12. This last year, I have had opportunities at work to learn and 
grow. 
Additional engagement items included in the SME method: 
R01. At work, I am treated with respect. 
R04. I feel free to express my thoughts, feelings and disagreements to 
my supervisor. 
R05. I can approach management with suggestions and criticisms. 






Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst hospital possible 
and 10 is the best hospital possible, what number would you use to rate 















Table 2. Criteria for Identifying Latent Adaptive Risk Using 2013 Operational Data.  
 
Patient Safety Culture  
High Risk: 
 In the lowest decile of the hospital distribution in Teamwork and Safety Climate domains 
 Insufficient response rate (<40% or <5 respondents) 
 In the lowest decile for the entity distribution in any Speak-up questions 
o In this work setting, it is difficult to speak up if I perceive a problem with patient 
care 
o I would feel safe being treated here as a patient 
o It is difficult to discuss errors 
o I am encouraged by others in this work setting to report any patient safety 
concerns 
o Problem personnel are dealt with constructively by our executive management. 
 
Employee Engagement  
High Risk: 
 In the lower 25th percentile of Grand Mean Score (GMS) of Gallup Health care database 
plus >/= 4 of the following: 
o At or below the 10th percentile of GMS (3.49) 
o Decreasing score from 2012 to 2013  
o At or below the 25th percentile for Q07, opinions count 
o At or below the 25th percentile for Q09, coworkers committed to quality 
o At or below the 25th percentile for R01 (At work, I am treated with respect) 
o At or below the 25th percentile for R04 (I feel free to express my thoughts, 
feelings and disagreements to my supervisor) 
o At or below the 25th percentile for R05 (I can approach management with 
suggestions and criticisms) 
o At or below the 25th percentile for HC04 (I would recommend Johns Hopkins to 





Patient Experience  
High Risk: 
 Press Ganey standard overall score 
o At or below the 30th percentile of the Press Ganey benchmarking database for the 
current survey period 

















 Replaced clinical leadership 
 Changed unit management 
 Restructured reporting relationships 




 Added clinical resources (e.g. specialty nurse, 
pharmacists, pain team) 
 Appointed safety resource 




 Implemented TeamSTEPPs 
 Provided monthly educational time for staff 
 Invited nurses to M&M 
 
Facilities/Technology  Made physical plant improvements (renovation, 
relocation) 




 Applied Lean Process Improvement 








































2013 to 2015 











p = < 0.003 




p = < 0.0001 
 
Positive Change 
(>/= 10 percentage points) 
2013 to 2015 
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APPENDIX A2: Employee Engagement and Patient Experience Survey 
Characteristics and Response by Hospital: For Triangulation Analysis 
 
 















Hospital 1  
 
66 1717 1261 73.4% 12036 2914 24.2% 
Hospital 2 
 
148 3398 2503 73.7% 13139 2720 20.1% 
Hospital 3 
 
351 10276 6958 67.7% 14628 4613 31.5% 
Hospital 4 
 
Data unavailable 11801 3460 29.3% 
Hospital 5 
 
63 1733 1085 62.6% 14410 4212 29.2% 
Total: 628 17124 11807   66014 17919  
 
Mean RR 69.4%, SD 0.046, 
Range 62.6, 73.7 
Mean RR 26.9%, SD 0.04, 




















Summary:  Demonstrable improvements in quality of care and patient safety have been limited to 
efforts focused on provider practice and frontline care processes.  Little attention has been paid to 
understanding the role leadership decisions play in creating risk within a health care system.  This 
paper describes a framework and tool designed to assess the risk of such decisions and identify 
appropriate mitigation strategies prior to implementation of a change.   
Methods:  Building on Reason’s construct of latent organizational failure and the concept of Latent 
Organizational Risk outlined in manuscript one, a tool was created to guide health care leaders 
through a process of inquiry that reveals potential risks of financial or strategic decisions before they 
manifest.  Through a process of engaging key stakeholders who are involved in and impacted by a 
change, potential for technical and cultural risks are explored, mitigated and monitored. 
Discussion:  Health care leaders who use this tool reported that it prompted effective proactive 
consideration of downstream risks.  They value the tool’s utility in a variety of situations and its 
adaptability to existing organizational planning processes.   
Conclusion:  To make continued progress in eliminating preventable harm, health care leaders must 
develop habits of intellectual wariness.  Seeking to identify risk created at all levels of the organization 
is a critical leadership practice.  The use of instruments like the Latent Risk Assessment tool may 
enable health care leaders to recognize potential risk and act to mitigate it before harm occurs.   
Background 
 
In the fifteen years since the Institute of Medicine released the report, To Err Is Human, only 




primarily on the point of direct care delivery, including: standardizing work (e.g., checklists with 
evidence-based practices to prevent bloodstream infections and improve surgical care) 48,49; 
establishing an infrastructure and governance to organize improvement efforts 50-52; and instituting 
regulatory standards focused on care delivery such as The Joint Commission National Patient Safety 
Goals 53. In contrast, capabilities to identify and assess activities or decisions made at the higher 
echelons of health care organizations that could create risk for patient harm are less developed.   
There are many ways in which leadership decisions can introduce risks.  One example is the 
decision to implement a new electronic medical record system or other health information 
technology without assessing the risks, only to find out afterwards that poor usability caused errors in 
decision making that lead to patient harm, and that ineffective integration into workflows created 
delays in care delivery and work arounds54.  Other examples of decisions with far reaching 
consequences include: setting staffing levels; changing rules for supervision; creating incentives and 
reward systems; and creating an environment that discourages discussion of mistakes and errors with 
senior leaders and board members.   
High-reliability science, which studies how organizations in high-risk industries, such as 
nuclear power, sustain high levels of safety, points to the importance of leadership in creating the 
vision, strategy, and culture for safety 55.  High reliability organizations (HROs) practice a healthy 
preoccupation with failure by creating intelligent wariness. Wariness is characterized by paying 
attention to details, detecting anomalies, understanding sequences, and imagining the consequences 
of failure and the potential causes 18.  As health care strives to emulate the leadership of high 
reliability industries, leaders and managers need new approaches to identify and mitigate risks. 
Historically, our health care system was not structured to measure safety as an intended outcome, 
ultimately leaving employees to be the final defense against a flawed system, too often relying on 
individual heroism, which is neither a reliable nor sustainable strategy to improve safety.  Unlike 
HROs, health care has also failed to systematically address hazardous behaviors that compromise 




Leaders in HROs embrace preoccupation with failure as a strategy by creating structures and 
a culture that actively discusses mistakes they do not want to make, and mindfully reflects on the 
actual mishaps and near misses in order to learn from them.  Staff in HROs also seek to proactively 
identify risks so as to avoid future mistake.  
Proactive assessment of risk is not new to health care.  The Joint Commission leadership 
Standard LD.04.04.05 requires one proactive risk assessment of a high-risk process at least every 
eighteen months 57.  These analyses typically focus on identifying potential active failures at the sharp 
end of process implementation – after decisions and investments have been made.  At this point, the 
organization has committed to the new or changing process and the risk assessment is focused on 
safe implementation.  While these tools are very useful in the formal assessment of risks in care 
processes, they miss the risk created by decisions, often called latent risks.  
Latent organizational risks are created at the blunt end when management decisions are 
being made and do not thoroughly account for potential unintended consequences.  These 
consequences may not manifest until frontline workers interface with the organizational conditions 
that increase the risk of failure or patient harm.  Resource constraints resulting from financial 
pressures places strain on health care providers and creates patient safety risk. Nurse staffing patterns 
and medical trainees work hours have been associated with higher mortality and poor outcomes 58-60.  
While incenting performance has been effective in driving outcomes in some key areas such as 
CLABSI, patient experience, and surgical site infection, doing so has required health care leaders to 
shift fixed resources from other areas to focus on these imperatives 46,61-63.  Health care leaders are 
frequently challenged with decisions like these where resources are limited, particularly in the context 
of overall rising health care costs62.  The Latent Risk Assessment tool offers a structured set of 
questions leaders can use to anticipate the downstream effects of their decisions.   
Organizational leaders and managers in health care lack concrete tools to assess the latent 




delivery systems.   To remedy this state of affairs, we developed a novel approach to identify and 
mitigate risk at the blunt end of the system.  This approach provides a means to evaluate the impact 
of leadership and management decisions on the complex systems of care delivery, and aims to 
anticipate the sharp-end consequences that may result.  Health care leaders today frequently face 
difficult decisions and tradeoffs. Specific tools to proactively assess the consequences of these 
decisions are needed to continue making progress in patient safety arena.  
Tool Development 
 
During the Johns Hopkins Medicine annual strategic planning process in 2015, leaders and 
scientists from the Johns Hopkins Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality sought to 
develop strategies to encourage leadership habits similar to those commonly found in HROs.  Based 
on Reason’s theory of latent organizational failure 21 and the conceptual framework of Latent 
Organizational Risk (Doctoral dissertation, Lori A. Paine, 2017), The Latent Organizational Risk 
Assessment Tool was designed to guide leaders to proactively assess potential risks that may be 
created by theirs or another leader’s organizational decisions.  The tool was used by leaders across the 
organization to demonstrate their adoption of this high reliability leadership practice.  The tool and 
risk assessment process is not intended to challenge the leader’s actual decisions, rather it is designed 
to facilitate intelligent wariness at the executive level, enabling decision makers to better discern 
possible latent risks, and to identify appropriate mitigating and monitoring strategies.  Inquiry rather 
than advocacy is central to this activity.  Rather than assume that their position or seniority enables 
them to have all the answer, leaders must ask more questions.  As a result, humility can lead to a 
better understanding of the situations leaders face.  Likewise, it may facilitate a more mindful 
consideration of distal implications resulting from of their strategic and financial decisions 22.   
Tool Description 
This 2-part tool was designed to be used by different types of health care leaders involved in 




use this tool when making decisions about clinical services or facility designs; Chief Financial 
Officers could use it when difficult budget decisions may impact clinical resources; Department or 
unit managers could use the tool when making staffing decisions and Human Resources leaders 
could use it before implementing policy changes; and Chief Information Officers could use it when 
choosing information technology tools, such as launching a new electronic health record.   
The tool starts with some preliminary work and prompts the user to describe the decision, 
the planned change, and the intended goal of the change (Figure 1). The user is also asked to 
consider all stakeholders that may be involved or in some way affected by the change, including 
anyone who will have some incentive to achieve the goal, and to describe how they will be involved 
in the risk assessment.  The latent risk assessment tool is laid out as a 3-column table (Figure 2) and 
has a list of potential latent organizational failures to consider, separated into technical (e.g., 
workload) and cultural (e.g., patient safety culture) characteristics.  Each area of failure has probing 
questions to prompt users to consider potential latent risks that could cause failures at the sharp end 
of care delivery.  The column headed “Response” is where users document the identified risks, how 
they plan to monitor the risks of their decision, and what they can do to mitigate the risks. 
The tool offers specific questions leaders can ask when making decisions and implementing 
strategic or operational changes.  Answers to the series of prompts included in the tool may reveal 
potential latent risks that could create favorable conditions for error at the sharp end of care delivery.   
How To Use the Latent Risk Assessment Tool 
A latent risk assessment is initiated when a leader or leadership team has a critical decision to 
make that could cause latent failures with potential to worsen the quality of work systems or 
processes, and could lead to patient harm.  This tool should be used as part of the strategic and 
change planning process and could be re-visited over time as part of a project management cycle.  
Leaders use the tool to thoroughly assess how the change(s) made from their decision will impact the 




planned action, which in the hypothetical case provided (Appendix A3) is whether to implement an 
across-the-hospital 2% cut in labor expenses to adjust for an unexpected shortfall in financial 
revenues and penalties from pay-for-performance programs.  The goal of this change is to achieve 
financial stability for the hospital.  Identifying who will be effected by the cut in labor expenses and 
who might be incented by achievement of this goal is a critical step.  To answer the questions in the 
tool, leaders cascade the change from their decision point, consider the impact at every level of the 
organization (upstream and downstream), and ensure that those closest to the bedside have a voice.  
The reduction in staff could compromise the safety and quality of patient care and could increase 
preventable harm or complications, which may in turn increase the costs of care. Thus, the leaders 
determine that clinical and nonclinical employees, along with patients and families, are the primary 
stakeholders of the change. Moreover, referring hospitals and physicians may be impacted by this 
change if, for example, staffing capacity prevents the acceptance of a patient transfer.  Because 
department leaders have personally been offered incentives to meet the revenue and budget targets 
by deciding where to cut labor expenses, they are also identified as important stakeholders in the risk 
assessment to ensure they hear other points of view and make informed decisions.     
Before finalizing their decision, the leadership team meets with the stakeholders to solicit 
their input in completing the Latent Risk Assessment Tool.   The body of the tool (Figure 2) guides 
the assessment team through questions designed to surface potential conditions in which a latent 
failure may occur that could lead to either technical or adaptive cultural risks. While not all questions 
are relevant to the ultimate decision, the team is encouraged to consider each one.  A completed 
sample tool (Appendix A3) describes the answers given by the team for the technical and cultural 
components of the organization in which latent failures could occur if staffing were reduced.  
Individual units or clinical service areas (e.g., operating suite) were the object of discussion for the 
assessment.   
The planned cut in labor is also discussed with leaders, managers and staff from several units 




impact this decision could have on quality of care and patient safety.  Each latent risk condition is 
explained in detail and plans are made for specific mitigation and monitoring strategies.  An overall 
summary of the assessment should include a communication plan and risk monitoring plan.  
 
Results and Lessons 
Senior leaders from across a large academic health system who participated reflect that use 
of this tool has led them to think differently about their decisions and the impact those decisions 
have made downstream.  We learned that adaptability of the tool has been essential to its successful 
implementation. Some leaders have modified it by incorporating the questions into their existing 
project management tools and charters.  For example, one organization modified their standard A3 
project management template, which is used for all major initiatives, to include a section devoted to 
risks and mitigation strategies.  Other leaders selected specific questions about workload for use by 
committees charged with reviewing vacancies and hiring requests by managers.  The tool is flexible 
and could be applied to a variety of issues and scopes.  For example, it could be used for a very 
specific issue a unit manager is facing about reducing nursing hours per patient day, for a department 
decision to reduce the number of surgical beds, or for a hospital-wide decision to implement an 
across the board budget cut.   
 
Summary and Next Steps 
Once senior leadership used the Latent Risk Assessment tool, they were quick to recognize 
the importance of proactively assessing for patient safety risk when making key decisions. The tool 
offered a structured and tangible way to look at a decision they needed to make, and help convene 
stakeholders affected by the potential changes to jointly assess latent failures and develop solutions.  
These solutions may vary, ranging from monitoring for specific risks after the change is 




While the tool was originally intended for senior leaders as part of strategic planning and change 
management processes, it can be broadly applied.  Future adaptations of the tool should include a 





















Figures & Tables 
 
Figure 1. Johns Hopkins Medicine Latent Risk Assessment Tool (Part 1) 
 
Strategic Objective: For leaders to assess for safety risks associated with financial and 
strategic decisions.  
 
This tool is intended to guide leaders through a process to proactively assess for latent risk and plan 
mitigation strategies. 
 











































1. Has there been an assessment of workload to 
determine if allocated staffing will be sufficient to 
maintain the standard of care?   
2. Are production pressures created that may force 
staff to cut corners? 
 
Knowledge, Skills, and 
Ability  
1. Are staff sufficiently trained to use the new 
equipment, processes, or workflow?  How do you 
know? 
2. Does staff have the necessary information, skills, 
and other resources? 
 
Interface design 1. Has there been a human factors analysis of the user 
interface, tools, environment, or processes? 
2. Do the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the staff 




1. How will supervisory roles (education, auditing, and 
management) be affected? 
 
Stress in the  
Environment 
1. Have there been other stressors introduced into the 
work environment that may affect the decisions? 
2. Are there competing priorities that may cause 
confusion and stress? 
 
Resilience and Mental 
State  
1. Is there or will there be an increase in fatigue?  Or 
boredom? 
2. Do staff schedules allow for adequate sleep to avoid 
fatigue? 
 
Change Management 1. Have change management strategies been employed 
















Patient Safety Culture 
 
1. Do recent culture scores for any areas suggest 
resilience?   
2. What aspects of culture (e.g., safety, teamwork, 
speaking up/speaking out) have been considered in 




1. What are the employee engagement scores for the 
areas affected by this decision? 
2. Are people empowered to speak up with respect to 
the decision? 
3. Is there trust and respect among coworkers on the 
units potentially affected by the decision? 
 
Beliefs about Bad 
Outcomes 
1. Have you asked what could go wrong as a result of 
this decision? 
2. Do the outcomes of this decision explicitly include 




1. Are work-around actions prevalent in the area 
affected by this decision? 
2. Will work-around actions be incentivized by this 
decision? 
 
Hazardous Attitudes 1. Is there encouragement or tolerance of risk-taking 
behavior? 
2. Is there a perceived license to bend the rules?  
 
 
Meaning or Ambiguity 
of Rules 
1. Are the policies and protocols to accommodate this 
decision clearly articulated?   
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APPENDIX A3: Case Example of Latent Risk Assessment   
 
Scenario: The hospital must reduce labor costs through a reduction in work force. 
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Workload 
Q1. Has there been an assessment of workload to determine if allocated staffing will be 
sufficient to maintain the standard of care? 
An assessment will be conducted and only units identified above their newly allocated staffing 
benchmark will be considered sufficient to maintain the standard of care.  In units below the 
benchmark, we will consider other expense reducing options. Prior to relying on benchmarks for 
this decision, consideration will be given to the accuracy of those benchmarks. To ensure our 
benchmarks are accurate, we will conduct focus groups with unit managers to understand any 
nuances for staffing that may not be reflected in our benchmarks.   
Q2. Are production pressures created that may force staff to cut corners? 
 
In procedure areas (e.g., operating suites) where patient volumes will remain high, risk for unsafe 
practices will be assessed by unit leadership before any reduction in work force or hiring freezes to 
minimize the possibility of units adopting unsafe practices to meet the ongoing demand.  
 
Knowledge, Skills and Ability 
Q1. Are staff sufficiently trained to use the new equipment, processes or workflow? How 




Q2. Does staff have the necessary information, skills, and other resources?   
Before any positions responsible for training staff or providing a clinical resource (e.g., 
leadership/management, clinical supervision) are cut, we will consider staff mix and years of 
experience on the unit.  Units with a larger proportion of inexperienced staff (less than 2 years of 
experience) will maintain clinical resource positions.  
 
Interface Design 




Q2. Do the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the staff match the work required of them? 





Supervision or Instruction 
Q1. How will supervisory roles (education, auditing, and management) be affected? 
Supervisory positions will remain filled during this time.  
Stress in the Environment 
Q1. Have there been other stressors introduced into the work environment that may affect 
the decisions? 
Recent implementation of barcode technology for medication administration as well as 
implementation of a new electronic health record has increased stress as staff adapt to new 
workflow.  This is a specific area of concern because work-arounds may emerge if staffing is 
lower.  
Q2. Are there competing priorities that may cause confusion and stress? 
There is institutional priority being placed on improvement of patient experience scores on all 
units.  Some staff express concern that a reduction in staffing will compromise efforts to satisfy 
patient expectations.  Patient experience scores and comments will be closely monitored.  
Leadership rounds will be a strategy to detect and address staff and patient concerns early.  
Resilience and Mental State  
Q1. Is there or will there be an increase in fatigue? Or boredom?   
If volumes surge and overtime is used, fatigue may become an issue in some areas.   
Q2. Do staff schedules allow for adequate sleep to avoid fatigue?   
Most units use 8 or 10 hour shifts.  In some limited areas, extended shifts are used to cover 
emergencies.  Use of 12 hour shifts is limited to high-needs areas.   
Change Management 
Q1. Have change management strategies been employed to facilitate new work or 
workflow?   
Reallocation of staffing may result in shifting or redefinition of roles and organizational 
management relationships. Town hall meetings will be held for staff to meet with leadership and 
discuss concerns about new workflow and need to minimize disruptions.  Managers will create 
structures to ensure they provide voice to all stakeholders involved in the change.  Managers will 
communicate why the change is necessary, demonstrate that they are mindful of the risks, and 
have on going risk monitoring and mitigation strategies in place.     
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Patient Safety Culture 
Q1. Do recent culture scores for any areas suggest resilience?   
Culture survey results about perceived sufficiency of staff will be reviewed.  For units scoring low 




Q2. What aspects of culture (e.g., safety, teamwork, speaking up/speaking out) have been 
considered in the implementation plan for this decision?   
Teamwork culture is an aspect of culture that may assist in making staffing reductions. Where 
there is poor teamwork climate, there is a perception of increased workload. Where teamwork is 
strong, there may be creative ways to address workload in the setting of work reduction. In areas 
where there is poor teamwork, reductions in staffing may be further corrosive or less tolerated.   
Staff Morale  
Q1. What are the employee engagement scores for any areas affected by this decision? 
Recent employee engagement scores will be used to determine which units may be better able to 
tolerate reduction in staff. In addition, areas with poor morale will need more in-depth risk 
assessment because reductions in staff are likely to exacerbate morale problems. This may include 
the organizational development department to assist in understanding underlying morale issues 
that may compromise quality care delivery. 
Q2. Are people empowered to speak up with respect to the decision?   
 
Town Hall meetings are used to encourage employees to speak up.  Those sessions will be used to 
actively solicit feedback on the impact of these reductions on patient care.  
Q3. Is there trust and respect among coworkers on the units potentially affected by the 
decision?   
 
Teamwork climate will be assessed using culture survey data.  Local assessment of risk will 
evaluate the level of trust on and between affected care areas. Interventions will focus on 
improving teamwork and respectful interactions. 
Beliefs about Bad Outcomes 
Q1. Have you asked what could go wrong as a result of this decision?   
Meetings with unit managers are being held to further understand the potential consequences of 
this decision including patient safety.  
Q2. Do the outcomes of this decision explicitly include measuring the impact on patient 
safety?   
Executive leaders will monitor metrics of quality and safety to ensure that these areas are not 
compromised.  
Violation-condoning Norms 
Q1. Are work-around actions prevalent in the area affected by this decision?   
As mentioned above, implementation of bar code medication administration and electronic health 
record implementation coincides with this cost reduction plan which could lead to work-arounds. 





Q2. Will work-around actions be incentivized by this decisions? 
In areas with productivity pressures, it may be perceived that working faster is more important 
than following safety protocols.  Managers will be reminded to communicate the leadership’s 
commitment to safety and that safety always comes first.  
Hazardous Attitudes  
Q1. Is there encouragement or tolerance of risk-taking behavior? 
Senior leadership will carefully praise accomplishment of financial goal achievement, while keeping 
safety a priority and not incentivizing risk-taking behavior.    
Q2. Is there a perceived license to bend the rules?  
Not Applicable 
Meaning or Ambiguity of Rules 
Q1. Are the policies and protocols to accommodate this decision clearly articulated?   
Relevant policies related to this effort include chain of command and staffing management, both 
of which will be reviewed with managers for compliance in the setting of potential staffing 
reductions. 
Q2. How will roles and responsibilities be affected?  
If staffing changes require a change in role and responsibilities, managers will clearly communicate 
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Jun 2011 Aboumatar H, Thompson D, Wu A, Dawson P, Colbert J, Marsteller, 
Kent P, Lubomski L, Paine L, Pronovost P, The Patient Safety 
Intersession: Three days of Learning to Educate and Empower Medical 




May 2014 Kasda E, Paine L.  Do You Know What Events Are Trending In Your 









Apr 2007 Brown SG, Paine LA, Wilson CC, Petty BG, Self-Reported Hand-off 
Event Analysis: Efforts Towards Standardization of the Hand-off 
Process., Society of General Internal Medicine (SGIM) Annual Meeting, 
Toronto, ON, Canada 
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Johns Hopkins University School of Nursing/The Johns Hopkins 
Hospital Department of GYN/OB Nursing Conference Clinical 
Expertise at the Bedside, Baltimore, Maryland 
Apr 1997 Putting the ‘I’ into Accountability, April 1997, Nursing Leadership 
Forum, Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, Maryland 
Jun 1997 Riding the Roller Coaster of Change, Johns Hopkins Nurses’ Alumni 
Association: Where Do Nurses Fit? The Changing Health Care Market, 
Baltimore, Maryland 
Oct 2003 Planning for Safer Care: A Case Study at Johns Hopkins Hospital. 
Practical Approaches to Quality in Patient Care: A Tools and Solutions 
Symposium. Johns Hopkins Center for Innovation in Quality Patient 
Care.  Baltimore, MD 
May 2004 Science of Safety, Johns Hopkins Wilmer Nursing Conference. 
Baltimore, Maryland 
Feb 2005 Science of Safety, Safety Academy. Johns Hopkins Institute for 
Nursing, Baltimore, Maryland. 
May 2005 Science of Safety, Maryland Association for Health Care Quality. 
Annapolis, Maryland. 
Aug 2005 Guideline presentation, dissemination and use (panel), Workshop on 




Hopkins School of Medicine, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation. Columbia, 
Maryland. 
Sep 2005 Science of Safety. Singapore Nursing Leadership Teleconference. Johns 
Hopkins Institute for Nursing, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Nov 2005 Patient Safety Begins with Me, Johns Hopkins Hospital Neurosciences 
and Psychiatry Department Patient Safety Workshop, Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, Baltimore, Maryland 
Oct 2006 Patient Safety Begins with Me, Johns Hopkins Hospital Neurosciences 
and Psychiatry Patient Safety Workshop, Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
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